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Abstract
The so-called ‘wall of silence’ presents a threat to successful police investigations and criminal 
trials. Explanations for it have focused on cultural narratives, including distrust in the police, a 
‘no snitching’ culture and manipulative ‘professional criminals’. Drawing on a study of serious 
multi-handed violence and ‘joint enterprise’ as a legal response, this article highlights the role of 
the law, and its agents, in generating silence among young suspects, whose primary concern is the 
legal risks of talking. Yet, these young people face a precarious trap, as their silence is interpreted 
as guilt by the police, propelling them towards charge. This article concludes that to avoid over-
charging and to encourage young people with knowledge of serious violence to talk, structural 
change is needed. The system must reverse the legal rules regarding silence and reform the law 
on secondary liability to reduce the legal risks of talking.
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Introduction
Newspaper headlines, such as ‘Murder hunt’s “wall of silence”’ in the United 
Kingdom (The Telegraph, 2005) and ‘A Cloak of Silence after South Bronx Killing’ in 
the United States (New York Times, 2016), are illustrative of an internationally rec-
ognised problem – that police investigations into serious violence are thwarted by the 
‘wall of silence’ or a refusal of individuals, en masse, to talk to the police (Brookman 
et al., 2018; Wellford and Cronin, 2000; Westmarland, 2013). Explanations for the 
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so-called wall of silence have been rooted in cultural narratives, specifically a ‘no 
snitching’ culture in the United States (Woldoff and Weiss, 2010) or no ‘grassing’ in 
the United Kingdom (Evans et al., 1996, cited in Clampet-Lundquist et al., 2015: 
268)1 and ‘professional criminals’ using their ‘right to silence’ to thwart investiga-
tions (Owusu-Bempah, 2018).
Reporting on interviews with young people and criminal justice practitioners, under-
taken for a study of serious multi-handed violence and ‘joint enterprise’ as a legal 
response,2 this article demonstrates that cultural narratives are offered by young people 
who experience violence as victims or witnesses to explain their non-engagement with 
police. However, for young suspects drawn into police investigations into serious vio-
lence as secondary parties, a key structural explanation dominates, as silence is primarily 
generated by concerns about the legal risks of talking in the context of joint enterprise – a 
legal doctrine that enables multiple individuals to be convicted for a single offence. 
Therefore, joint enterprise (and its application in practice) ensnares young people in a 
precarious trap: drawing them into an investigation and persuading them to remain silent 
(due to the legal risks of talking) – yet this propels them towards charge, as their silence 
is interpreted as guilt by the police. This scenario presents a particularly significant threat 
for those drawn into investigations into fatal violence, as it can result in a life-changing 
and identity-shattering conviction of murder and decades in prison (Crewe et al., 2020). 
We conclude by arguing that, to avoid over-charging of young people on the periphery of 
violence and discourage silence among those with real knowledge of serious violence, 
the system must reverse the adverse inference placed on silence and reduce the risks of 
talking by reforming the law on secondary liability.
The problem of silence, cultural explanations and 
responses
Silence is part of speech: ‘it is a form of social interaction imbued with meaning and emo-
tions conveyed within social context’ (Hallsworth and Young, 2008: 134). In the context 
of police investigations, silence is viewed suspiciously as a sign of guilty knowledge. As 
such, it represents a significant barrier to establishing the full facts of the case, and iden-
tifying and eliminating potential suspects (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993; 
Wellford and Cronin, 2000). The ‘wall of silence’ is a metaphorical barrier that prevents 
people with assumed knowledge of an incident, en masse, from passing information to the 
police. The explanations for such behaviour have predominantly been cultural – blamed 
on distrust of the police and a ‘no-snitching’ culture among particular groups.
Distrust has been associated with individuals’ direct negative experiences of the 
police, including police harassment and the overuse of force (Brunson, 2007; Downing 
and Copeland, 2015; Rosenfeld et al., 2003). As stated by one respondent in Rosenfeld 
et al.’s (2003) study, ‘[Mistreatment] deters you from . . . wanting to do any type of busi-
ness with [the police]’ (p. 297). For Black people, in particular, research suggests that 
non-engagement with the police is the result of multiple personal and vicarious experi-
ences of discriminatory police practice (see, for example, Bowling and Phillips, 2007), 
which generate distrust (Brunson, 2007; Downing and Copeland, 2015).3
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A ‘no snitching’ culture has also been blamed for thwarting engagement with the 
police, as ‘the code of the streets’ emphasises the personal settling of disputes and the 
rejection of formal legal recourse (Anderson, 1999; Clampet-Lundquist et al., 2015). 
Such expectations are said to be reinforced by violence towards, and social marginalisa-
tion of, those who do disclose information to the police (Clayman and Skinns, 2012; 
Rosenfeld et al., 2003). Although contradictory evidence from the United States suggests 
that concerns about retaliation are ‘perception driven’ (National Institute of Justice, 
1997: 128), there are examples of drug informants being ‘assaulted, raped and murdered’ 
(Woldoff and Weiss, 2010: 187). Certainly, as Rosenfeld et al. (2003) conclude, few 
labels ‘are more stigmatizing and more enduring, than that of a snitch’ (p. 298).
Given these dominant narratives, attempts to improve engagement with the police 
among the polity have focused on improving trust in the police by emphasising ‘proce-
dural justice’ (Bradford et al., 2018; Clayman and Skinns, 2012; Tyler, 2003) and reduc-
ing the risk of identifying witnesses who provide evidence in a criminal case (e.g. see 
Crown Prosecution Service, 2020). Running alongside these endeavours, law reform has 
attempted to disincentivise silence among suspects.
Silence among suspects and the legal response
Prior to 1994, the ‘right to silence’ meant that judges may have remarked upon a suspect 
remaining mute in police interviews, but they were not able to explicitly invite juries to 
draw inferences of guilt from silence (Owusu-Bempah, 2018). Research undertaken in 
the 1980s and 1990s highlighted that only a minority of suspects were entirely uncoop-
erative during police investigations, as most answered questions and made statements 
‘either to admit or to deny the accusations’ (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 
1993: 50). For those who remained silent in interviews, the strongest predictor was the 
legal advice they had received, with other factors including the severity of the offence 
and previous criminal convictions (Moston et al., 1993). Many of those who remained 
silent in police interviews went on to plead guilty and were convicted (Royal Commission 
on Criminal Justice, 1993), demonstrating that the right to silence did not prevent the 
gathering of information or conviction of suspects. However, concerns that ‘professional 
criminals’ were exploiting their right to silence, impeding the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of police investigations, led to changes in the law (Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice, 1993). The introduction of Section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994 allowed inferences of guilt to be drawn from ‘a defendant’s failure to mention, 
when questioned under caution, a fact relied on at trial’. (Owusu-Bempah, 2018: 111). 
Possible inferences included that the information subsequently provided in court was 
invented or would not have stood up to police investigation (Owusu-Bempah, 2018).
The reform of the law increased the legal risks of remaining silent in police interviews, 
amplifying the chances of a guilty verdict. This was despite concerns raised by the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) that such changes would be ‘against the interests 
of justice’, as they placed additional pressure on vulnerable suspects to engage in police 
interrogations, including those who were ignorant about the law (p. 52). There was a rec-
ognition of the plethora of reasons why innocent people might remain silent, including to 
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protect loved ones, due to the anger, humiliation, intimidation, disorientation, and confu-
sion generated by police interrogations, or to provide the opportunity to fully consider the 
allegations against them with legal guidance (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 
1993). It is the legal risks of talking, specifically, to which we now turn.
Uncovering the legal risks of talking
Although the existing literature has the least to say on the legal risks associated with talk-
ing to the police, research on ‘snitching’ indicates such concerns among individuals. For 
example, Rosenfeld et al.’ s (2003) research with 20 ‘active street offenders’ found that 
some feared that they would shift from ‘complainants into suspects’ by talking them-
selves ‘into a hole’, being caught lying, and ‘drawing attention to their own misdeeds’ in 
their conversations with police (p. 298). As highlighted by the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice (1993), the potential to incriminate oneself was considerable for those 
unfamiliar with legal definitions and police procedures. As Innes (2003) notes,
. . . the police manage the [interview] interaction in such a way as to gradually persuade the 
suspect to reveal more and more information. In the process of doing so the suspect is, perhaps 
without realizing it, further incriminating himself. (pp. 182–183)
Racialised concerns about the legal risks associated with police encounters have also 
been indicated by research conducted in the United States. Interviews with young Black 
men found that, during such encounters, they made ‘appraisals of personal or group sus-
ceptibility to physical, psychological, social, economic, or legal harm’ (Smith Lee and 
Robinson, 2019: 157–158), based on personal experiences of aggressive policing, as 
well as an acute awareness of societal racism and ‘the embeddedness of racism in law 
and criminal justice’ (p. 170).4 In this article, we argue that increasingly punitive sen-
tences and ‘net-widening’ policies and laws, such as joint enterprise in England and 
Wales (and joint criminal enterprise or accomplice liability in the United States, Australia 
and Hong Kong – see Reid et al., 2019 and Weinburg, 2019), increase the risks of engag-
ing in a police investigation.
In England and Wales, joint enterprise or ‘secondary liability’ (Crown Prosecution 
Service, 2019b) enables a secondary party to be convicted of a principle offence if they 
‘intended to encourage or assist’ another (the principal party) to commit the offence. 
Although foresight (of a second violent crime during the commission of a primary offence 
of burglary, for example) is no longer sufficient to convict the secondary party of the vio-
lent offence, it can be used as evidence of intention to encourage and assist (Crown 
Prosecution Service, 2019a).5 Such rules mean that talking to the police about being pre-
sent at the scene of a violent incident or being associated with a key suspect, for example, 
poses particular legal risks for individuals who can then be charged with the principle 
offence, based on ‘complicity’ (see Hulley et al., in progress). This has very significant 
consequences in cases involving fatal violence – a murder conviction and a life sentence, 
with potentially decades in prison.6 This article argues that, in this context, the legal risks 
of talking persuade young suspects drawn into the joint enterprise ‘net’ to remain silent. 
Yet, these young people then become ensnared in a legal trap, as their silence is used to 
infer guilt, propelling them towards being charged with the principle offence.
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The current study
The study examined youth violence in the context of the legal doctrine of joint enterprise 
in England and Wales. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with four groups of 
participants in England. Table 1 summarises the details of the participants involved in the 
study.
The study employed a purposive sampling technique to recruit all participants. 
Practitioners who had worked on cases of serious violence involving multiple young 
people included police detectives and lawyers. The former worked in the Homicide and 
Trident (gang) units in the Metropolitan Police and were accessed through a senior 
officer in each of the units, who requested volunteers for the study via email. Each vol-
unteer was then contacted directly by the research team. Crown Prosecution Service 
lawyers were contacted through senior staff in the organisation, who identified individu-
als with relevant experience and arranged interviews with those who volunteered. 
Barristers (including Treasury Counsel) were identified through key contacts, snowball-
ing, advertising and Internet research focusing on lawyers with experience of prosecut-
ing and defending cases of serious violence involving multiple young people. Each 
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aTrident Gang Crime Command is a Department of the Metropolitan Police Service, London, responsible 
for tackling ‘gang-related’ crime, including non-fatal shootings.
bThis also includes one retired judge who had previously worked as a lawyer.
cOne young person refused to provide their age.
dAll of the female prisoners were White.
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lawyer was contacted by the research team, either through their chambers or directly. As 
part of this snowballing process, one retired judge with experience of multi-handed trials 
also participated in an interview.
Young people aged 25 years and younger7 were accessed through a Youth Offending 
Team, a further education college and council-based youth engagement project in 
London.8 Most had experience of violence as witnesses, victims or perpetrators. Each 
organisation sought out volunteers and arranged interviews for the research team to 
undertake. The prisoner group included men and women who had been convicted of 
serious violent offences (wounding/causing grievous bodily harm with intent, man-
slaughter and murder)9 when aged 25 years or younger. Prisoners were drawn from 
three prisons: an adult male Category B prison, a Young Offenders’ Institution and a 
female closed prison. Each prison provided the research team with a list of individuals 
who fit the research criteria (age and offence). Researchers then approached individuals 
to establish the relevance of joint enterprise to their case. Informed consent was obtained 
from all volunteers, following a detailed introduction to the research and the ethical 
considerations.
Interviews lasted between one and three hours; all were audio-recorded and profes-
sionally transcribed verbatim. Questions related to individual’s life histories (for practi-
tioners, this focused on professional histories); experiences of violence (for practitioners, 
the process of investigating cases of serious ‘group-related’ violence involving young 
people); understandings and perceptions of joint enterprise and the law related to serious 
violence; and – for practitioners – perceptions of young people’s understandings of the 
law. The data were analysed on a computer software package (NVivo) using an iterative 
approach. This is a reflexive process, whereby the data are repeatedly revisited to develop 
and refine meaning and understanding (Srivastava and Hopwood, 2009).
Short surveys were also provided to participants in each group to ascertain key demo-
graphic characteristics. These data were analysed using SPSS, and the main results are 
shown in Table 1. Overall, almost half of the participants in prison (47%) identified 
themselves as being convicted as a ‘secondary party’ in their case, 21% as the ‘principal 
party’, 6% as ‘neither’ and 26% ‘didn’t know’. For those convicted of murder, these 
figures were (respectively) 52%, 13%, 8% and 26%, highlighting the prevalence of sec-
ondary parties within our sample.
Findings
Cultural drivers of silence among victims and witnesses
In the context of witnessing or being a victim of serious violence, young participants 
reported that they refused to engage with the police due to the cultural narratives that 
dominate the literature, specifically distrust of the police and fear of physical retaliation 
and social ostracisation from their community.
Most commonly, feelings of distrust towards the police were generated by negative 
personal interactions. Many of the young people in the study had experienced a multi-
tude of accumulated negative interactions (Brunson, 2007), often first occurring in child-
hood. These ranged from police officers speaking to them disrespectfully, to sustained 
harassment, racist abuse, police corruption (e.g. falsifying evidence) and brutality. As a 
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direct result, young people refused to cooperate with the police when they became vic-
tims of violence or bore witness to it:
I used to come back from school and get stopped and searched just for no reason, just for 
jumping off the bus and buying a drink. [. . .] So, I have not really trusted the police from an 
early age. So obviously, when I got shot and I ended up going to hospital, I’m not going to talk 
to the police. (Devan, Mixed-race, convicted of murder)
As indicated by Devan, while distrust towards the police was common among the 
young participants, it was particularly prevalent for those from Black and minority ethnic 
(BAME) backgrounds, who felt that they experienced explicit and implicit bias (Goff 
et al., 2014). Such perceptions and experiences of institutionalised racism and police 
discrimination (Bowling and Phillips, 2007; Smith Lee and Robinson, 2019) negatively 
impacted their willingness to engage with the police:
Personally, I don’t really like them. They’re ignorant and a lot of them are racist. [. . .] Even the 
Black police are racist. (Marcus, Black Caribbean, victim/witness/perpetrator of violence)
I wouldn’t confide in the police. I don’t trust them. (Teana, Black British, victim/perpetrator of 
violence)
Alongside feelings of distrust, many young people refused to engage with the police 
due to their views on ‘snitching’, embedded in a shared cultural code:
In this culture we’re in, people don’t really snitch. (Malik, Black British, victim/witness/
perpetrator of violence)
But in the streets, you’re labelled an outcast, a snitch. You have nothing. You have no reputation, 
nothing. All you’re going to be labelled as is a snitch. (Zachery, Mixed-race, convicted of 
murder)
While some young people attributed their refusal to ‘snitch’ to the intense loyalty they 
shared with their friends ‘on road’, not snitching was often described as part of the ‘code 
of the streets’ (Anderson, 1999):
When you are looking in the movies and they are fighting the villain. You are the villain. That 
is you. The villain does not phone the police when he gets beaten up. [. . .] You cannot have it 
both ways. You cannot be saying, ‘Fuck the police’, and selling and doing all the illegal things 
in the world, but then when something happens to you, you want to bitch up and phone the 
police. [. . .] you might be sharing the same space, but you are not living in the same world. 
(Jamel, Black British, victim/witness/perpetrator of violence)
The way we grow up out here [. . .] to go testify on someone [. . .] is wrong regardless if he’s 
killed your mum. To go testify on him now, the way you get trained out here is that you are not 
allowed to do that, you’re a snitch, you’re lower than low now. (Jenson, Mixed-race victim/
witness of violence)
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The penalty for snitching was most commonly stigmatisation (Rosenfeld et al., 2003; 
Sprigge, 1964) – long-term friendships and meaningful relationships could be torn apart 
by informing on another, and young people risked being ostracised and denigrated. 
Reputations could be ruined as distrust set in, and individuals could be banished from 
social groups, including their own family:
I would never talk to the police about anything [. . .] Because the label of snitch is not a very 
good label. [. . .] You’d get disowned. (Dalton, Black Caribbean, convicted of GBH)
You’d be excluded from the group. [From] Family, friends. (Lucy, White British, convicted of 
Section 18)
Alongside ostracisation, the physical risks of ‘snitching’ were perceived to be brutal 
for the informant and, potentially, their families, as young people repeatedly stated: 
‘snitches get stitches’. Naomi graphically recollects the threats she received from the 
men who she witnessed murder a friend of hers:
They were going to kill me, they’ll beat me up, they’ll come to my house. (Naomi, Black 
British, victim/witness of violence)
[. . .] what the police don’t understand is that people don’t come to you and we don’t report 
these crimes because we’re going to get hurt worse. We’re trying to protect our family, we’re 
trying to protect our loved ones and ourselves in general. (Eva, White British, victim/witness of 
violence)
It was unclear the extent to which ‘snitching’ resulted in physical violence (see 
National Institute of Justice, 1997; Woldoff and Weiss, 2010), but there were individual 
examples of retaliation, which discouraged victims and witnesses from further interac-
tion with the police:
So, every time I called the police, [the perpetrators] came back harder at me and they did worse 
things to me and my family. And that’s why I don’t call the police, in fact, that’s why I don’t get 
involved in things now. (Eva, White British, victim/witness of violence)
In the absence of retaliatory violence, the violent capabilities of an avenger were 
enough to generate sufficient fear to silence a young person. While the risks of ostracisa-
tion and physical violence deterred young victims and witnesses from engaging with the 
police, for those who were drawn into police investigations as suspects, it was the legal 
risks of talking that silenced them.
Fear of legal risks as a driver for silence among suspects
Talking in police interviews was precarious for young people drawn into investigations 
through secondary liability, for two reasons: first, because of the low threshold at which 
their behaviour could be interpreted as evidence of complicity; second, because of the 
disproportionate and severe consequences of being found guilty as a secondary party, 
particularly for murder:
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I learnt a bit about [joint enterprise] before I went in to trial [. . .] and I said nothing because I 
felt if I say anything then even the smallest part under joint enterprise is paramount to admitting 
to murder. [. . .] it probably hinders investigations because other people don’t want to admit to 
things. [. . .] Because admitting anything, even involvement, can end up getting you a murder 
conviction. (Ian, White British, convicted of murder)
Supplementary findings from this study suggest that Ian’s concerns were warranted, 
as police and prosecution lawyers justify charging individuals for serious violence based 
on relatively weak notions of intent to encourage or assist, such as association between 
parties (Hulley et al., in progress).
For many suspects, silence was maintained due to their ignorance of the law on sec-
ondary liability specifically, as well as the broader legal concepts that were central to 
their prosecution, such as intention (as suggested by the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice, 1993). This lack of legal knowledge led to concerns about being ‘tripped up’ in 
a police interview, exacerbated by their vulnerabilities related to age and, for some, men-
tal health issues. The young interviewees were not ‘professional criminals’; in fact, many 
lacked experience of the criminal justice system (particularly in the context of serious 
violent offences), and this directly influenced their decisions to remain silent in police 
interviews:
You don’t know what’s going on, that’s the honest truth, or why this is happening. So the best 
thing to do is go ‘no comment’. (Jason, Black African, convicted of murder)
I have never experienced a murder trial. I have never experienced an attempted murder trial. I 
have never been in a situation like that before. I was mentally not there. Physically I was 
suffering from anxiety, depression of being on a case like that. I was scared in case I slip up and 
say the wrong thing [. . .] or I do something wrong, which makes me look like I’ve done 
something. (Raj, Asian Bangladeshi, convicted of murder)
Raj highlights the multiple vulnerabilities many young people suffer and the impact 
of these on their decision to remain silent. Young people feared that they would incrimi-
nate themselves or talk themselves ‘into a hole’ (Rosenfeld et al., 2003: 289). Such risks 
were highlighted by those who did speak, such as Rosie who described naively ‘opening 
up’ to the police about personal matters, which contributed to her being charged with 
murder as a secondary party, despite initially being arrested for ‘perverting the course of 
justice’:
[the police] kind of smile at you and they comfort you and they say it’s all going to be okay. 
[. . .] they ask you such personal things and you open up about things that maybe you’ve never 
even told anyone and things like that just so that they can sit there and go, ‘Do you know what, 
actually I think that she did this’, or, ‘she did that’. That is really, really heart-breaking. (Rosie, 
White British, convicted of manslaughter)10
Young people’s inexperience of the criminal justice system and its processes was in 
stark contrast to the expertise of police detectives who had been trained in interviewing 
tactics and strategies:
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The Metropolitan Police Service invest a great deal of time, effort and money in training 
interviewers, so by the end of that I would exhaust your account to the point that you’re down 
on yourself, and I would be almost pushing you to say ‘why did you run? Don’t tell me you’re 
scared, you had nothing to do with it’. (Trevor, White British, detective)
The police have the muscle and the resources to intimidate people into . . . because they do 
threaten people, if you don’t give evidence you get arrested for this, that and the other. (Gerald, 
Black African, defence lawyer)
Prisoners’ recollections of detectives pressurising them to talk in interviews included 
‘grinding’ them down, restricting sleep by keeping lights on in custody and intimidation, 
which involved emphasising the risks of not talking:
[The police gave] me a choice, you can either talk and probably walk or don’t talk and get put 
in a joint enterprise charge. (Kevin, Black-British, convicted of murder)
Despite the implication of such an ultimatum, young people’s realisation that the 
police were in a stronger position to frame the narrative of the incident, due to their skills 
and expertise, often encouraged them to remain silent. This was further reinforced by 
underlying feelings of distrust in the police and, for young Black men in particular, vul-
nerability in the face of police power. This distrust and vulnerability were grounded in 
negative interactions with the police over many years, as well as an acute awareness of 
the history of police mistreatment of their community and institutional racism (Smith 
Lee and Robinson, 2019):
The system doesn’t help itself, the way they treat ethnic minorities. [. . .] There’s a lack of trust 
of the police community in general, the majority of races. [. . .] The way it’s perceived is police 
are after you. They're just going to keep throwing something until it sticks, and that’s the 
mentality of a lot of people. It has been evident to a lot of people, to myself in this case, just 
throwing something until it sticks. (Joshua, Black African, convicted of murder)
Regardless of me speaking now or not [in the investigation], [the police are] still going to 
continue their case.
[. . .] there is an argument that they might make, which is ‘Tell me where you were and then I 
can rule you out’.
No, that’s bullshit. [. . .] I’ve been arrested by police so many times, they come up with their 
own assumption anyway.
So you don’t feel like you can trust them -
No.[ . . .] Not at all. Not one little bit. [. . .] I’ve been in situations when I was younger when 
I’ve gone to police stations and said ‘This is what has happened’. I’m still being charged 
[laughs], I’m still getting arrested for certain things. So what was the point of me even speaking 
to you then? (Kelvin, Black Caribbean, convicted of murder)
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In this way, young Black men made racial appraisals about their vulnerability to legal 
harm ‘and their limited ability to protect themselves’ (Smith Lee and Robinson, 2019: 170).
Young people’s lack of understanding of the law, their vulnerabilities, relative power-
lessness, and their deeply embedded distrust or fear of the police led to them placing 
unwavering trust in their legal representatives. In homicide cases, young people reported 
that their defence lawyers’ instructions were almost exclusively to stay silent and ‘go no 
comment’:
My solicitor advised me to go ‘no comment’ in my interview. So, I was nineteen. That’s my 
solicitor. Whatever she tells me, I’m going to do. So, she told me to go ‘no comment’, I went 
‘no comment’. (Raj, Asian Bangladeshi, convicted of murder)
I wouldn’t have spoken [to the police] because my legal’s [legal representative] told me to go 
no-comment and you follow your legal’s, you put all your trust. That’s basically God to you 
at that time. You know what you are facing and you realise, ‘hold on, I’ve come to jail and 
the starting sentence for gun crime is actually 30 years’. I’m thinking, ‘I’ve been around for 
18 years and that feels like a long, long, long time. What the hell! 30 years? I’ve never lived 
30 years, I don’t know what 30 years is like’. (Lloyd, Black Caribbean, convicted of murder)
Defence lawyers who participated in the study concurred that in cases of murder their 
advice to young clients was almost always to remain silent, based on the potential impli-
cations of their client talking, the power imbalance between their client and the police, 
and the emotional pressure of police interviews. This was particularly so when the stakes 
were highest and with young people who were especially vulnerable:
What’s your advice [to clients] until you have all the evidence? Is it generally no comment?
No comment, yes. Because it’s too serious to make a mistake. And, of course, average Joe 
Public thinks, ‘Well, if you’ve got nothing to hide you should tell the police’ but [. . .] what can 
happen is you can inadvertently put your foot in it. If you’re young – and I think kids sometimes 
want to please you, they want you to like them. [. . .] So with a young man I’d be very reluctant 
to let them answer questions. (Ahmed, Asian Pakistani, defence lawyer)
In this way, lawyers recognised that clients were ‘scared of [. . .] joint enterprise’ 
(Simon, White British, defence lawyer). Offering a ‘no comment’ interview made strate-
gic sense early in the prosecution process: silence was ‘a good tactic, because at that stage, 
they don’t really know what the evidence is going to be and it doesn’t really get held 
against them’ (Alana, White British, defence lawyer). Lawyers considered that it was 
preferable to have an ‘adverse inference’ drawn from silence ‘than having proved to be a 
liar in a taped interview’ (Ahmed, Asian Pakistani, defence lawyer), even if the lie was an 
‘innocent’ one. Although they recognised that silence could have adverse implications,
The wall of silence [. . .] plays into [the prosecutions’] hands. I remember the prosecution 
counsel in a case saying, whether or not they gave evidence, nobody had actually said, ‘I saw 
X killing’. And he said ‘that’s another layer of proof that they’re in a gang because of the 
harmonious silence’. (Simon, White British, defence lawyer)
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Simon’s observation highlights the legal risk for young suspects who remain silent in 
police interviews – that it can then be used to infer guilt. This assumption is embedded 
in law in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and, as we will set out in the 
next section, is also rooted in police practice, with significant legal implications.
The silence trap
The following assumption was widespread among detectives who participated in the 
study:
. . . anyone who speaks in a suspect interview is normally telling the truth and they’ve got 
nothing to do with that murder. [. . .] Very rarely do we have people involved admitting it or, if 
they’re involved as a secondary party on the outskirts, telling us what’s happened. (Trevor, 
White British, detective)
Detectives assessed that young people who refused to speak in a suspect interview 
were knowledgeable about an offence and, often, deeply implicated in it. While there is 
little empirical support for their conclusions,11 they appeared to be rooted in a theory of 
rational thinking that ‘if I’d done nothing wrong and I was arrested for murder I would 
be screaming it from the rooftops’ (Trevor, White British, detective):
The fact is, if you haven’t done anything you are going to say. (Rob, White British, detective)
If someone, god forbid, came in and beat up your husband and you were sat there, and you 
recognised them, you wouldn’t say, ‘didn’t know who did it. No idea’ . . . You’d be the first one 
stood at the parade saying, ‘That was him’. (Eric, White British, detective)
The detectives’ assessments of what constituted a ‘rational choice’ in such circum-
stances were embedded in normatively male and White notions of rationality (see, for 
example, Lloyd, 1979). In this context, they used cultural explanations to make sense of 
silence among young Black men in particular, reflecting a broader narrative of ‘color-
blind racism’ (Bonilla-Silva, 2003). For example, Eric (White British, detective) 
described non-engagement of young BAME people as ‘a cultural thing. There’s a dis-
trust’, while Keith (White British, detective) expressed confusion that despite the police 
being ‘more transparent now than we have ever been in our history [. . .] we are less 
trusted now [. . .] especially young Black men and because it’s a cultural thing they just 
don’t trust us’. Such narratives ignored the structural, racialised, prejudicial practices 
that young Black and Mixed-race people are exposed to in the criminal justice system, 
which increase their risk of being convicted, including in the context of joint enterprise 
specifically (see Young et al., 2020; Williams and Clarke, 2016; also see Bonilla-Silva, 
2003; Smith Lee and Robinson, 2019).
While cultural distrust was used by police to contextualise patterns of silence among 
Black suspects, at an individual level the rational choice theory dominated their narra-
tives, with detectives and prosecution lawyers arguing that those who presented as sus-
pects remained silent because they were guilty and they were trying to ‘play the system’.
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[Suspects] are very switched on. They are manipulative and devious when it gets to the court 
process; there is no doubt about it. They know how to play the system [. . .] they will never say 
anything, or very rarely say anything at the interview, they are canny from the start and they 
will wait until [. . .] all the prosecution evidence is served and then. . . and only then will they 
commit themselves; they will wait until the last possible moment. [. . .] They know what they 
are doing. (Paul, White British, prosecution lawyer)
The assumption that young suspects ‘know what they are doing’ ignores the vulnera-
bilities that many young people reported in this study – linked to their youth, ignorance 
of the law, inexperience of the criminal justice system and feelings of powerlessness. 
However, silence kept young people ‘in the frame’ (Rob, White British, detective) and 
was, ultimately, instrumental in decisions to charge them with serious violent offences, 
including murder. As Adrian explained in the context of his most recent homicide case,
I guarantee this to you, if someone had [spoken] this weekend to me, I would not have taken the 
case to the CPS, but because he ‘no commented’, I took it to CPS and charged them. (Adrian, 
White British, detective)
I think no comment increases the likelihood of them being charged in the first place. (Jeremy, 
White British, detective)
Police detectives experienced suspects’ silence as deeply frustrating, as they implored 
young people to talk in interviews, stating that (contrary to the direct route to charge 
outlined above) engaging would prevent young people from being charged.
If he said in interview, ‘This is what happened. Yes, I’m part of this group, yes we have beef 
with this kid [. . .] and we’ve all run over to him because we’ve seen him, and then when I’m 
there [. . .] three of them pulled knives out [. . .] But, I just stood there and kind of almost froze 
and let it go’, then I wouldn't expect them to be charged with murder because I don't think 
they’re guilty of murder. (Adrian, White British, detective)
Despite this argument, when pressed detectives recognised that talking could lead a 
suspect to implicating themselves:
Sometimes I think ‘do you know what, that person would have been better off just giving an 
account’ because the likelihood is if that person turned round and said, ‘Do you know what, 
I’ve been really bloody stupid, I carried the gun for somebody, his name was Matt’, you know.
But doesn’t that implicate them?
Yes, it does, but you’ve got things like helping the police, you’ve got the early guilty plea which 
reduces your sentence, you’ve got age, you’ve got previous criminal history factors. [. . .] 
You’d get a lower sentence. Yes, they’d still get a [murder] charge. (Louise, White British, 
detective)
Here, Louise highlights the potential reduction in sentence that a secondary party 
could receive if they talked in an interview, ignoring both the significant impact on a 
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person of receiving a murder conviction (see Crewe et al., 2020) and the extraordinary 
long tariffs handed down for murder with a gun, which start at 30 years for a person aged 
18 years or above. Such life-shattering outcomes make the prospect of talking a very 
risky decision for a young person.
Concluding thoughts
This article presents a unique picture of the reasons young suspects in cases of multi-
handed serious violence report remaining silent in police interviews and the significant 
implications for them of doing so. Crucially, it draws attention to the previously neglected 
impact of the legal risks of talking that persuades young suspects, drawn in as secondary 
parties, to remain silent and takes account of their multiple vulnerabilities, including age, 
ignorance of the law and relative powerlessness. Yet, it shows that their silence draws 
them into a legal trap.
Silence, like speech, is open to (mis)interpretation, and in the context of suspect inter-
views, the police ‘hear’ silence as guilt, and this propels young people towards being 
recommended for charge. In this way, their silence is weaponised by detectives, to be 
used against them. This weaponisation of silence is fuelled by an institutional (legally 
permitted) association between silence and guilt, embedded in detectives’ normative 
(situated, gendered and racialised) understandings of what constitutes ‘rational’ behav-
iour in police interviews.
Rather, for those at the scene of a violent incident or associated with a principal sus-
pect, secondary liability exposes them to the significant risk of being convicted of a seri-
ous violent offence (including, for some, murder) and a substantial prison sentence. 
Many such young people remain silent due to fears about the legal risks of talking. These 
risks, as well as young people’s vulnerability, also shape the advice provided by expert 
legal counsel to remain silent and young people’s eagerness to follow it. Therefore, the 
law on secondary liability and, specifically, the low threshold at which an individual can 
be considered culpable for a serious violent offence are central to suspects’ silence in 
investigations.
It is worth noting that the vacuum created by young people’s silence in a criminal 
investigation provides space for the police and prosecution to insert their own case nar-
rative. In ‘joint enterprise cases’ involving Black and Mixed-race suspects, research has 
shown that the ‘gang’ narrative dominates, as it offers a deeply embedded, normatively 
understood explanation for serious violence involving multiple defendants (see Williams 
and Clarke, 2016; Young et al., 2020). Thus, silence among young Black and Mixed-race 
suspects is likely to put them at particular risk of legal harm.12
These findings, we hope, will refocus the discussion of the ‘wall of silence’ in two 
ways: first, by encouraging a distinction between the silence of victims and witnesses 
and the silence of suspects, implicated in investigations into multi-handed serious vio-
lence; second, by encouraging further discussion of the role that the criminal justice 
system – the law and its agents – plays in generating silence of secondary parties. On the 
latter, we make three final points.
First, we urge police and prosecution lawyers to recognise their part in enabling (or 
discouraging) individuals to engage in criminal cases, just as the research on procedural 
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justice has alerted us to the role of the police and criminal justice agents in encouraging 
community engagement. Currently, the police draw multiple young people into investi-
gations,13 based on weak notions of intention to encourage or assist (such as association 
between parties Hulley et al., in progress), who are silenced due to the fear of the extraor-
dinary risks of being convicted of serious violence. It is this silence that is then used to 
propel young suspects towards charge, based on the inference of guilt that it generates. 
This inference (which is legally permitted) is rooted in a normative (situated, gendered 
and racialised) understanding of rationality and ignores the vulnerability that young peo-
ple feel when faced with the power of the police and the criminal justice system. For 
young Black men in particular, just as running from the police can be an attempt to avoid 
‘the indignity of racism’ and ‘a legitimate fear of death’ (Smith Lee and Robinson, 2019: 
172–173), remaining silent in a suspect interview offers protection against the racialised 
misinterpretation of talk and the potential legal harm that it exposes.
Second, we call for a return to the pre-1994 rules on the ‘right to silence’,14 whereby 
judges were able to remark on the silence of suspects but could not explicitly invite 
juries to draw inferences of guilt from it. It is notable that the research presented here 
suggests that, contrary to its aims, the current adverse inference rule does not encour-
age suspects in cases of multi-handed serious violence to engage in police interviews. 
Rather, just as the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) feared, we believe 
that in ‘joint enterprise cases’ in particular it leads to the over-criminalisation of young 
people on the periphery of violence and, therefore, the law is ‘against the interests of 
justice’ (p. 52).
Third, and principally, we call for reform to the law on secondary liability and its 
application in practice to remove the low threshold at which an individual can be charged 
with a serious violent offence, murder in particular. Instead, we propose that those pre-
sent at a violent altercation should be offered alternative, lesser charges, specific to the 
role that they played in the incident, or that, if necessary, a new offence be created which 
appropriately labels ‘assistance and encouragement’ of an offence and offers a propor-
tionate punishment in response (see Hulley et al., in progress). Such changes would 
reduce the currently excessive legal risks that young people face as secondary parties, 
improve the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system and may encourage 
greater participation in police investigations.
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Notes
 1. Although there has been a transatlantic appropriation of the term ‘snitch’ into common par-
lance (see Clayman and Skinns, 2012).
 2. The term ‘joint enterprise’ was replaced with ‘secondary liability’ by the Crown Prosecution 
Service in 2019. While the former term tends to be avoided by legal scholars and, increas-
ingly, legal practitioners, it remains widely understood and offers short-hand for a complex 
area of law. It is for this reason that we use it throughout this article to denote the legal rules 
as they relate to (the variously termed accessorial, secondary or complicity liability (see van 
Sliedregt, 2019: 187).
 3. Black and Mixed-race people report lower levels of trust and confidence in the police in the 
United Kingdom (Office for National Statistics, 2018a). This is particularly relevant to a dis-
cussion about engagement with the police because Black and Mixed-race young people in the 
United Kingdom are also more likely to be victims of serious violence and homicide (Office 
for National Statistics, 2018b).
 4. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this.
 5. ‘Foresight’ was ‘abolished’ as a direct pathway to conviction in R v Jogee and Ruddock 
[2016] UKSC 8.
 6. The average tariff (minimum term) for life sentences in England and Wales increased from 
12.5 in 2003 to 21.1 in 2013 (Crewe et al., 2020).
 7. During one interview, it transpired that the young person was currently aged 27.
 8. Youth Offending Teams work with young people aged under 18 who are convicted of criminal 
offences. ‘Further education’ colleges are formal sites of education available to individuals 
aged over 16 – they are not universities or polytechnics (the ‘higher education’ system).
 9. Wounding/causing grievous bodily harm with intent is defined as a person who unlawfully 
and maliciously, with the intent to do some grievous bodily harm or with the intent to resist 
or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any other person, either wounds another 
person or causes grievous bodily harm to another person (Crown Prosecution Service, 2018). 
Murder involves the unlawful killing of a person with the intent to kill or cause grievous 
bodily harm, while manslaughter is unlawful killing without such intent (Crown Prosecution 
Service, 2019b).
10. This also highlights the oft-ignored point that some individuals do ‘talk’ in police interviews, 
as reported by a very small number of suspects in this study who talked to the police because 
they were naïve about the law or believed that the criminal justice system would achieve 
justice. This fits with the narrative in this article, that for suspected secondary parties who are 
not naive about the legal risks of talking in such cases or who followed legal advice, silence 
was identified as the best course of action in police interviews.
11. One participant who self-identified as the principal party in the offence disclosed that her 
silence was due to guilt: ‘. . .I did it. So what am I going to tell them? [laughs] Yes, it was me! 
[laughs]’ (Lucy, White British, Section 18). Other participants who self-identified as principle 
parties hinted at similar justification for their silence, but also reported being anxious about 
the risk of receiving an extraordinary long prison sentence on conviction. The detectives’ 
comments related to silence fail to differentiate between principal and secondary parties (see 
Hulley and Young, in progress).
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12. Again, we are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing out attention to this significant 
implication of our findings.
13. Including the ‘tail-end Charlies’, as described by a prosecution lawyer in this study.
14. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this important implication.
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